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Abstract
Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican as well as
Janusz Salomon put forward versions of supernaturalism
that avoid the existence of a religion which alone provides
the true revelation and the only way to salvation and which
teaches that God acted in this world. Their rejection of
revealed, exclusive religion is based on an argument from
religious diversity and an argument from natural explana-
tions of religious phenomena. These two together form the
‘common-core/diversity dilemma’. In this article I refute
these two arguments by arguing that explaining the origin
of belief in supernatural agents does not provide a reason
for not believing in the existence of supernatural agents.
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1 The thesis of this article
(1.1) In this article I shall argue that both arguments against
first-order supernaturalism that are put forward by Branden
Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican (2015) and that are accep-
ted by Janusz Salamon (2015) are unsuccessful and thus are5
no reasons for accepting either Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s
‘second-order supernaturalism’ or Salamon’s ‘agatheism’.
(1.2) ‘First-order supernaturalism’ consists of ‘supernaturalist be-
liefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious
tradition in preference to all others’ (Thornhill-Miller and Mil-10
lican 2015, p. 3). Thornhill-Miller and Millican contrast this with
‘second-order supernaturalism, which maintains that the universe
in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particu-
lar, have been formed by supernatural powers working through
natural processes.’ This is what Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786)15
and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) called ‘natural reli-
gion’. Like Mendelssohn and Lessing, Thornhill-Miller and Mil-
lican as well as Salamon think that a religion, like Christianity,
that claims that this religion alone is based on true revelation
and provides salvation and that God acted in this world is irra-20
tional.
(1.3) The two arguments against first-order supernaturalism con-
stitute the horns of the ‘common core/diversity dilemma’ (CCDD),
put forward by Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican:
[The first, oppositional or sceptical, horn:] That in so far25
as religious phenomena (e.g. miracle reports, religious ex-
periences, or other apparent perceptions of supernatural
agency) point towards specific aspects of particular reli-
gions, their diversity and mutual opposition undermines
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their evidential force; [The second, common-core or natur-30
alistic, horn:] while in so far as such phenomena involve
a ‘common core’ of similarity, they point towards a prox-
imate common cause for these phenomena that is natural
rather than supernatural. (3)
The authors apply the first horn to miracles that are responses35
to prayers and the second horn to religious experiences. (21) Let
me respond to both horns.
2 The argument from conflicting reports against
first-order supernaturalism
(2.1) We can summarise the authors’ statement of the first horn40
as follows:
‘Prayer is popularly attributed with the power to eﬀect
medical cures in many diﬀerent religions, and is commonly
understood within them as evidence of specific religious
truth. Yet religions conflict on the various specifics, so45
such evidential claims cannot reasonably be accepted un-
less they have solid empirical backing to distinguish them
from the claims that they implicitly contradict. Without
such diﬀerential support, the best that could be hoped for
is evidence of prayer’s eﬃcacy in general.’ (22) But ‘there50
is no scientifically discernible eﬀect for intercessory prayer
as assessed in controlled studies.’1
1Masters et al. 2006, p. 21 quoted in 2015, p. 21. By contrast, Brown
et al. 2010, using a diﬀerent methodology, comes to a diﬀerent conclusion:
‘This study found a significant eﬀect of PIP [proximal intercessory prayer]
on auditory function across the tested population (P < 0.003).’ Swinburne
2006 argues that we should not expect that God would respond to prayers in
controlled studies. Brown 2012, ch. 2 discusses how healings through divine
intervention can be discovered. Keener 2011, chs. 7–9 presents contemporary
healing reports from various cultures.
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(2.2) I respond first that although responses to petitionary prayer
can provide evidence for the existence of God or for the truth of
a religion, the theist does not have to hold that there is such55
evidence. God may choose not to answer prayer in a visible and
provable way. He may answer prayers only when not being sub-
jected to controlled studies, he may respond in a non-detectable
way, or he may, for various reasons, not respond at all. Christians
believe that God sometimes heals people in response to prayer,60
but the evidence for this is often not strong enough to raise the
probability of the existence of God or of Christian doctrine sig-
nificantly for someone who attributes a low prior probability to
Christian doctrine (i. e. someone who does not believe Christian
doctrine already). The main purpose of these healings is presum-65
ably the health of the person and the interaction between God
and the person. Even the person himself often does not know
with certainty whether he was healed through divine interven-
tion. If somebody has cancer and is healed after his and others’
petitionary prayer in a way that surprises all the doctors, that70
is a good reason for believing that God intervened, but it could
also have been a spontaneous healing or an eﬀect of psychological
changes, because these things happen sometimes. In either case
the person has a reason for thanking God.
(2.3) Responses to prayer need not be evidence for the truth of a75
specific religion. Even if there is only one religion that provides
the true revelation and salvation, God can also answer the pray-
ers of people who have not heard the true revelation or who have
not accepted it. Therefore it is not true that the ‘diversity and
mutual opposition [of the reports of responses to prayer] under-80
mines their evidential force.’
(2.4) Even if reports about answers to prayers would conflict with
each other because they are supposed to confirm the religion in
which they are reported, it could be that the reports in one reli-
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gion are true and those in the other religions are false. Thornhill-85
Miller and Millican provide no evidence for their claim that there
are credible reports of responses to prayers that are in mutual
opposition. However, even if something undermined the eviden-
tial force of reports of answers to prayers, that would not make
much diﬀerence because no religion’s rationality depends on such90
reports.
(2.5) More relevant here, but not discussed by Thornhill-Miller
and Millican, are other miracles, in particular the resurrection
of Jesus. It is often argued that there is strong evidence for it.2
If there were equally much evidence for a miracle that would95
confirm a diﬀerent, conflicting religion, then in at least one case
there would be misleading evidence. However, as far as I can
see there are no such conflicting miracle reports. And even if
something undermined the evidential force of the reports of the
resurrection of Jesus, that would undermine only one item of100
evidence for the existence of God among many. One can believe
in Jesus’ resurrection without believing that the historical evid-
ence for it is strong enough to convince somebody who attributes
a low prior probability to the existence of God.
I conclude that the first horn of the CCDD provides no good105
reasons for believing that there is no true first-order supernatur-
alism.
2Swinburne 2003, T. McGrew and L. McGrew 2012, Wright 2003, Craig
2000, Habermas and Licona 2004.
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3 The argument from biases against first-order
supernaturalism
(3.1) We can summarise the authors’ statement of the second110
horn as follows:
There is a common core of religious experiences that turn
out to be explicable in naturalistic terms. ‘Recent re-
search in the cognitive science of religion [. . . ] provides a
persuasive naturalistic explanation for the near-universal115
tendency to attribute events to supernatural agents.’ (28)
First, ‘our hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD)
is the human cognitive operator that has been postulated
to explain why it is normal for us to see agency rather
than randomness everywhere in the world around us: why120
we see faces in clouds, attribute illness and bad weather to
witchcraft, and perceive the hand of fate in our lives rather
than the action of abstract and impersonal forces. The
evolutionary advantage of its hyperactivity is commonly
explained with the observation that the cost of perceiving125
more agents than actually exist (e.g. mistaking wind in
the tall grass for a predator) is low, while perceiving too
few agents (e.g. mistaking a predator for wind) would,
at some point, be fatal.’ (29) Second, ‘Theory of mind
(ToM) refers to the capacity to attribute mental states –130
such as beliefs, desires, and intentions – to oneself and to
others.’ (29) ‘we consistently overextend ToM, projecting
humanlike qualities of consciousness even to inanimate ob-
jects and abstract forces, and are thus predisposed to see
gods, spirits, witches and other agents – whether visible or135
invisible – acting in the world.’ (30) ‘HADD and ToM to-
gether lead us to find specific kinds of meaning and design
in randomness, to see the action of invisible agents even
in unplanned, non-intentional processes, and to attempt
to relate to such agents as we would to other intentional140
beings. Working together, these two processes – all by
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themselves – seem to provide a reasonably persuasive nat-
uralistic explanation for the belief in invisible, intelligent
supernatural agents like the gods and spirits found univer-
sally across human cultures.’ (30)145
Now we can understand better their claim concerning CCDD:
‘The contradictions between diﬀerent religious belief systems, in
conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces that
shape their common features, persuasively challenge the ration-
ality of most kinds of supernatural belief.’ (1)150
(3.2) In reply, I first ask whether these biases exist. They cer-
tainly exist in some people in some situations. But do they exist
in all people, and are they at work in all religious experiences
and beliefs? Many of us never attributed illness or bad weather
to witchcraft. Some people seem to have the opposite bias. They155
believe that the universe, the animals and we human beings came
into being just by material causal processes.
(3.3) There are things or events that are caused by agency, and
other things that are caused by non-personal causes. There are
agents with bodies, and, most people believe, there are bodiless160
agents, such as God, angels, demons, ghosts. If a person believes
in agents that do not exist, that can be due to a bias or due
to some other error, such as certain beliefs in his environment.
However, you can discover the existence of a bias only if you
make the assumption that beliefs in question are false and if165
they are in fact false. If you assume that there are no demons
in waterfalls and that thunder is not caused by some demon or
god, then you can be justified in assuming that somebody who
believes in such demons has a bias to believe in more agents than
actually exist. But you cannot use the hypothesis of a belief bias170
in order to defeat the truth of beliefs on whose falsity you based
the bias hypothesis. So you cannot use HADD and ToM for
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defeating beliefs in demons or God if the theories of HADD and
ToM are based on the assumption that there are no bodiless
agents. Can the theories of HADD and ToM be justified without175
assuming that there are no bodiless agents? They certainly need
the assumption that some beliefs about bodiless agents are false,
for example the belief that thunder is caused by a god. But
does this assumption justify belief in a bias towards believing in
more agents than actually exist that is at work in all beliefs in180
agents? Imagine that when you come home you discover that
your living room is in a mess, the content of all drawers is on
the floor, and the door is open with a broken lock. If you then
believe that a person broke in in order to steal, are there HADD
and ToM at work? Should you question your conclusion that185
there was an intruder, thinking that you should ‘systematically
compensate’ (36) for your bias towards believing in actions where
there are none? If you believe that you have a bias towards beliefs
of kind P, then you should not just simply lower the credence
of all your P-beliefs. Instead, you should gather evidence and190
perceptual data and revise your P-beliefs in their light. In the
case of the intruder, not much will change. Likewise, perhaps
belief in God remains unchanged if the believer tries hard to base
it on evidence. Perhaps it has always been based on evidence.
The reference to HADD and ToM does nothing to show that it195
is not.
(3.4) Even if we accept that HADD and ToM exist, we should
conclude only that we must try hard to base our beliefs about
God and religion on evidence and perception. That is, we should
search for all our beliefs and perceptual experiences that support200
propositions about God or religion and try to draw the right
conclusions from them. Even if we accept that HADD and ToM
exist it is wrong to simply lower our credence in all our beliefs in
actions or agents, or in our beliefs in bodiless agents. It would
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also be wrong to ascribe to all beliefs in bodiless agents a lower205
probability than the one they have in virtue of the evidence and
the perceptual experiences. Instead, if we accept that HADD
and ToM exist, we should make an eﬀort to base our beliefs
about God, ghosts, demons, and religion on the evidence and
on perceptual experiences. We should make this eﬀort anyway.210
Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s assumption that ‘sceptical con-
siderations such as the Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’ (46)
defeat, or lower the probability of, beliefs in bodiless agents and
in supernatural interventions is wrong.
(3.5) More simply put, Thornhill-Miller and Millican commit a215
genetic fallacy when they think that putting forward a natural-
istic explanation of beliefs in supernatural agents or supernatural
actions supports the assumption that these beliefs are false. Say-
ing that belief in God is caused by a bias to believe in more agents
than there are does nothing to support the view that there is no220
God. If you have good reasons for believing that there is no God,
then you may be justified in believing that belief in God is often
caused by HADD or ToM. But you cannot use HADD or ToM in
order to defend rationally the belief that there is not God or that
first-order supernaturalism is false. For that you would need to225
defeat the usual arguments for God’s existence or to put forward
evidence against the existence of God, for example the evil in
this world. HADD and ToM are not among the evidence for or
against the existence of God.
(3.6) We can see why this is so also by considering for what230
naturalistic explanations of beliefs or experiences are relevant.
A naturalistic explanation of a belief in p can undermine the
claim that the existence of belief in p is evidence for the truth
of p. For example, Jesus’ disciples believed not only that Jesus
rose from the dead but that they believe that Jesus rose and is235
the saviour because they saw the risen Jesus. The resurrection
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and the encounters explain how the disciples came to acquire
this belief. If it is hard to explain the existence of this belief
in another way, then the belief is evidence for the resurrection
of Jesus. If, on the other hand, there is a plausible account of240
how the disciples might have acquired this belief even though
Jesus did in fact not rise from the dead, then the belief is not
evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. Only in special cases is
some people’s belief in p evidence for the truth of p. In all other
cases putting forward an explanation how the belief in p might245
have emerged does nothing to show that p is false and does not
justify not believing p.
(3.7) I conclude that the Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma, and
the arguments from diversity and from naturalistic explanations
of religious phenomena included in it, does not defeat, or lower250
the probability of, any beliefs in supernatural agents and su-
pernatural actions. These arguments therefore do not support
preferring second-order supernaturalism or Salamon’s agatheism
to first-order supernaturalism, for example Christian doctrine.
Considerations about what causes religious beliefs and about re-255
ligious diversity are not relevant for finding out the truth about
God. Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s mistake (and many other
critics of revealed religion made this mistake) is that they try
to refute revealed religion in some other way than by examin-
ing the evidence, and thus the various arguments, for or against260
the existence of God and the evidence for or against Christian
doctrine.
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